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Abstract
We critically examine the implications of the most favored nation (MFN) clause un-
der asymmetric environmental standards. Using an oligopolistic intra-industry trade
model, we show that environmentally benecial trade diversion and higher world wel-
fare obtain under tari¤ discrimination relative to MFN.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been growing public concern related to the degradation of the global
commons (i.e. ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity and climate change). The shift
from the local to the global scale has rendered environmental problems more visible and
suggests a critical link between environmental and trade policies. The rst-best solution to
environmental problems is to use cooperative environmental policy. However, an inequitable
sharing of the burden of pollution abatement, incentives to free-ride, and di¢ culties in
enforcement make cooperation among countries di¢ cult. Consequently, it may be possible to
improve welfare through trade measures by reducing free-riding incentives as a second-best
outcome. For example, as per the WTO, trade sanctions have been utilized in the Montreal
Protocol (protection of the ozone layer), the Basel Convention (international transportation
of hazardous waste), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES). With respect to a specic product, the U.S. has applied a penalty tax on foreign
automobile manufacturers who do not meet the domestic Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards. Challenged by the European Community as discriminatory, this policy
was upheld under article XX(g) of the GATT (Fischer et al., 2003).1
Presently, environmental standards di¤er substantially across countries. Producers in
countries with stricter environmental standards have worried about the impact of those stan-
dards on their competitiveness in world markets whereas governments and rms in countries
with less strict standards have expressed concern about new barriers being erected against
their exports.2 As a result, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been involved in
the discussion of environmental standards and their impact on trade and welfare. If trade
policy is to be used, should the instruments be designed to explicitly include environmental
concerns? If so, should countries with di¤erent standards be treated in a symmetric or dis-
1Article XX of the GATT includes important environmental-related provisions that override other oblig-
ations of the GATT, including potentially MFN. See the key measures in paragraphs (b) and (g).
2The linkage between environmental and trade policies has been examined by Conrad (1993), Barrett
(1994, 1997), Kennedy (1994), Ulph (1996), and Engel (2004), among others.
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criminatory fashion? At the heart of WTO is the principle of non-discrimination - embodied
in the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause in Article I of the General Agreements on Tari¤s
and Trade (GATT) - under which WTO members are required to treat products from all
other members equally. Unlike the existing literature on MFN, we internalize environmental
damage in formulating trade policy to examine the positive implications of the MFN prin-
ciple as opposed to tari¤ discrimination.3 We also discuss a special case where trade policy
maximizes social welfare without environmental concerns in order to examine the unintended
consequence of tari¤ discrimination.
Under an oligopolistic intra-industry trade model, we address the following questions.4
What is the pattern of tari¤s under MFN and discrimination? Is MFN adoption necessarily
desirable from an aggregate world welfare perspective? We show that discrimination causes
environmentally benecial trade diversion via punishing countries that are free riding in the
supply of a global public good. In this way, a larger share of world production is undertaken
by countries with stricter environmental standards and higher world welfare obtains under
discrimination relative to MFN.
2 Model
We develop a simple oligopoly model of international trade between n countries (indexed by
i = 1:::n). Firms produce a joint product: a homogenous traded good x and pollution result-
ing from the production of x. The pollution generated is a transboundary public bad that
a¤ects all countries equally, regardless of the point of origin. Each country contains a single
prot-maximizing rm and has a predetermined pollution abatement standard i [0; 1] ; such
as a limit on CO2 emissions or the extent of land-use restrictions in biodiversity-sensitive
areas. Costs to rm i are C(xi; i) = ixi, where xi =
nP
z=1
xiz denotes the total output
produced in country i and sold across all markets, and  is the marginal cost of abate-
3Even from a pure trade policy perspective, the economic case for non-discrimination is hardly obvious
(Caplin and Krishna, 1988, Horn and Mavroidis, 2001, Saggi and Yildiz, 2005).
4See Hwang and Mai (1991), Choi (1995) and Saggi (2004).
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ment.5 Given the abatement standards, emissions by rm i are xi(1  i). Note that when
no abatement is undertaken, emissions are equal to output level while emissions are zero if
abatement is maximal. Aggregate damages are then given by 	 = !
nP
z=1
xz(1  z), where !
is the marginal benet of abatement (or marginal damages).
We assume that inverse demand pi =   
nP
z=1
xzi is linear in each country, where xzi
denotes the output sold by rm z in country i, and rms compete in quantities (Cournot
competition). In this case, rms make independent decisions regarding how much to sell
in each market (i.e. markets are segmented).6 Thus, it is su¢ cient to focus on only one
countrys market equilibrium. Country is tari¤ schedule is a 1xn vector: ti  (t1i; :::; tni)
where rm z faces a specic tari¤ tzi when exporting to country i and tii = 0 for all i.
In order to critically examine the implications of MFN when environmental standards
di¤er across countries, we consider a two-stage game under two tari¤ regimes: MFN and
discrimination. In the rst stage, given exogenous abatement standards and the tari¤ regime,
countries simultaneously choose their tari¤ schedules. Then, rms compete in quantities.
3 MFN versus Tari¤Discrimination
We obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. There are n rst-order conditions for prot
maximization for each rm in each market. Firm js prots from exports to country i are
given by
ji = [pi(xi)  j   tji]xji (1)
where xi =
nP
z=1
xzi. Firm js rst-order condition yields
xji =
 P
z 6=j
xzi   j   tji
2
(2)
Solution for the product market equilibrium leads to the following output levels:
xii =
+
P
z 6=i
(tzi + z)  ni
n+ 1
, xji =
+
P
z 6=j
z +
P
z 6=j;i
tzi   n(j + tji)
n+ 1
(3)
5For simplicity, marginal cost of production and transport costs are assumed to be zero.
6As in Brander and Spencer (1985).
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At the trade policy stage, countries simultaneously choose their tari¤ schedules to max-
imize their own welfare. Due to linear costs and market segmentation, strategic indepen-
dence of tari¤s obtains so that the own tari¤s of country i do not e¤ect its export prots
(
X
z 6=i
iz(t i)). Under tari¤ discrimination, country i solves:7
Max
ti
Wi(ti)  CSi(ti) + ii(ti) + TRi(ti) 	(ti; t i) (4)
where CSi =
x2i (ti)
2
denotes consumer surplus in country i; ii(ti) = x2ii(ti) the prots of rm
i in its own market, TRi(tji, tki) =
P
z 6=i tzixzi country is tari¤ revenue, and 	(ti; t i) the
environmental damage su¤ered by each country.
Solution of the welfare maximization problem in (4) yields the following optimal discrim-
inatory tari¤s
tji =
1
(n  1)
264
P
z 6=i
( + !)z   (n  1)( + !)j
2
+  i
375 (5)
where  i represents total protection under tari¤ discrimination:
 i =

 
n+ 7
(6)
such that

 = 3(n  1)+ ((n  5)  2(n+ 1))
X
z 6=i
( + !)z
and
 = (n  1)((n+ 1)(! + !i) + (n  2)i)
Asymmetric abatement standards across countries yield di¤erent mark-up levels for each
exporter. This gives country i an incentive to discriminate across its exporters:
tji   tki =
( + !)(k   j)
2
(7)
Proposition 1 Under tari¤ discrimination, the following results hold: (i) country is op-
timal tari¤ on country j is higher than its tari¤ on country k i¤ country js abatement
7The special case in which trade policy maximizes welfare without environmental concerns (	 = 0 in (4)
and (8)) is examined below.
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standard is lower than that of country k: tji  tki i¤ k  j; (ii) The true cost ranking of
countries is preserved: k+t

ki  j+tji i¤   ! while it is reversed: k+tki  j+tji
i¤   !.
The rst part of the proposition implies that by being biased against (in favor of) the
countries with low (high) abatement standards, discrimination causes environmentally bene-
cial trade diversion. In other words, tari¤discrimination works as a punishment mechanism
for the countries free riding in the supply of the global public good (those with less stringent
environmental policy). Note that the trade diversion becomes larger as both the marginal
benet of abatement, !, and the marginal cost of abatement, , get larger. The second
part of the proposition immediately follows from equations in (5) and (6) and argues even
a stronger result: when ! exceeds , the discrimination is so strong that the exporters with
higher abatement standards gain competitive advantage over the ones with lower standards.
It is important to note that the same tari¤patterns (part (i) of the proposition) would obtain
under discrimination even when trade policy maximizes social welfare function without en-
vironmental concerns.8 Under such a case, we argue that discrimination causes unintended
environmentally benecial trade diversion, and a reversal of the true cost ranking never
arises.9
The problem under MFN di¤ers from the problem in (4) in only one respect: country i
imposes the same tari¤ ti on all exporters and solves
Max
ti
Wi(ti)  CSi(ti) + ii(ti) + TRi  	(ti; t i) (8)
Due to symmetric treatment under MFN, it is immediate that
tMi =
Mi
(n  1) (9)
8When 	 = 0 in (4) and (8), di¤erent environmental standards only lead to cost di¤erences across
countries and our analysis converges to the existing MFN literature. In the remainder of the paper, we
discuss this scenario as a special case of our analysis.
9We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the former point.
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where Mi represents the total protection under MFN. It is proved by Saggi (2004) that under
Cournot competition with constant marginal costs (as assumed here), total protection under
discrimination  i does not change when it adopts MFN tari¤s:
Mi = 

i (10)
This implies that relative to discrimination, MFN adoption does not change the equilibrium
price and total imports while it has distributional implications for its trading partners. Using
the optimal tari¤s in (5) and (9), we obtain
tMi   tji =
( + !)(
P
z 6=i
z   (n  1)j)
(n+ 1)
(11)
Proposition 2 Country is discriminatory tari¤ is higher than its MFN tari¤ on country
js export i¤ country js abatement standard is lower than the average abatement standard of
all exporters to country i:
tMi  tji i¤ j  ~i =
P
z 6=i
z
n  1
As might be expected, countries always have unilateral incentives to discriminate since
MFN constrains its choice set without conferring any benet in return. The above proposition
informs us that when a country deviates from Article I and discriminates, the trading partner
with the highest abatement standard necessarily gains while the one with the lowest standard
necessarily loses. The impacts on the other countries depend on the distribution of the
abatement standards across countries. Note that proposition 2 holds irrespective of whether
or not trade policy incorporates environmental concerns.
3.1 World Welfare
Article I of the GATT requires each member country to adopt MFN on a multilateral basis
rather than unilaterally. To this end, we consider two scenarios, one where all countries
have to abide by Article I and another where they are free to discriminate. Given the fact
that discrimination causes an environmentally benecial trade diversion, is discrimination
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necessarily desirable from the perspective of aggregate world welfare? We dene world
welfare as the sum of individual countrieswelfare including environmental damages.10 The
comparison between world welfare under discrimination (WWD) and MFN (WWM) yields
WWD  WWM =
( + !)(n!   ) (n 2)
2
"
(n  1)P
z
2z   2
P
z 6=r
zr
#
(n  1) (12)
Note that as long as n  3, the term inside the square brackets is positive since it can be
written as a sum of squares.
Proposition 3 World welfare is higher under discrimination relative to MFN unless the
marginal benet of abatement (!) is su¢ ciently low relative to marginal cost of abatement
():11
WWD  WWM i¤ !  
n
To see the intuition for this result, consider the situation where marginal benet of abate-
ment (!) approaches zero. Then, the cost of abatement becomes pure production cost so
that under discrimination each country imposes higher tari¤s on low cost producers, thereby
causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption eliminates this trade diversion and
improves world welfare. On the other hand, when the marginal benet of abatement exceeds
the minimum threshold, a larger share of world production is undertaken by countries with
more stringent environmental policy under discrimination than under MFN, leading to an
improvement in world welfare.
Since abatement standards di¤er across countries, tari¤ discrimination generates asym-
metric losses and benets for adopting and recipient countries relative to MFN. Therefore,
it is also worth asking which countrys deviation from MFN benets world welfare the most?
10The following propositions hold even under our special case where trade policy maximizes welfare without
environmental concerns. Note that environmental damage enters world welfare in both our general and special
cases.
11Interestingly, aside from the strategic e¤ect of the abatement choice, Barrett (1997) obtains minimal
abatement under full cooperation when ! < n . Since the abatement standards are exogenous here, our
results converge.
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We make the following comparison:
WWM~i  WWM~j =
n( + !)(n!   )(i   j)(2  i   j)
2(n  1) (13)
where  =
nP
z=1
z
n
is the average abatement standard and WWM~i (WW
M
~j ) denotes world
welfare when country i (j) uses optimal discriminatory tari¤s while all other countries impose
MFN tari¤s.
Proposition 4 Suppose !  
n
holds. The deviation from Article I (MFN) by country i
improves world welfare more than the deviation by country j i¤ (i   j)(2  i   j) > 0.
The above proposition implies that, given that the other countries adopt MFN, tari¤
discrimination by the country with the average abatement standard (say, country a) benets
world welfare the most. To see this, suppose i =  and i 6= j. Then (13) becomes
WWM~i  WWM~j =
n( + !)(n!   )(  j)2
2(n  1)  0 i¤ ! 

n
(14)
The intuition is as follows. By discriminating, only country a imposes higher (lower) tari¤s on
all exporters with abatement standards below (above) the average . Tari¤ discrimination
by any other country is either harmful for some countries with relatively high standards
(above the average) or benecial for some countries with relatively low standards (below the
average).
4 Conclusion
Based on the argument that asymmetries in economic circumstances are important deter-
minants of the desirability of MFN, we examine the case where countries are asymmetric
only with respect to their environmental standards. Under MFN, countries with weak envi-
ronmental standards gain competitive advantage without being treated di¤erently in export
markets. By contrast, these countries face higher tari¤s under discrimination that diminish
or even reverse their cost advantage. As a result, environmentally benecial trade diversion
9
occurs, leading to a higher world welfare under discrimination relative to MFN. These results
hold generally, even when countries do not consider environmental damage in designing their
trade policy to maximize welfare.
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